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Love and Communication 
A review essay1 
 
Speaking into the Air: A History of the Idea of Communication 
J. D. Peters. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999 
 
Speaking into the Air is, quite simply, the most original and thought provoking book on communication 
that I have read. It is dazzlingly and sometimes obscurely erudite yet with a clear and coherent 
argument that challenges our current commonsense views about communication. I am persuaded by 
this argument, though less so by the point at which John Durham Peters himself takes leave of it. That 
point seems to me to be oddly, uncomfortably, strange; something which, in itself, needs some 
explanation.  It’s partly to do, I  think, with the Americanness of the book and partly its religiousness. 
Neither of these two points, I hasten to add, are implied criticisms. But they might begin to account for 
its strangeness, for this is a  weird and eccentric book, voyaging in strange seas of thought alone, far 
from the busy, crowded lanes down which the usual academic shipping travels.  
 
The book’s subtitle is ‘A History of the Idea of Communication’ and starts from the uncontentious 
proposition that communication has emerged as a key concern for us all (not just academics) from the 
late 19th century onwards. And this is intimately connected with the rise of new technologies of 
communication from the telegraph to the internet. At the heart of this concern is a continuing, still 
unassuaged anxiety about mediated communication and the ways in which it manipulates and distorts 
reality and truth. Sincere and genuine, direct and immediate communication seems to be all the more 
important in the face of the manifold potential of ‘the media’ to bear false witness: interpersonal 
communication ‘became thinkable only in the shadow of mediated communication’ (p. 6). The scandal 
of mediated ‘miscommunication’ prompted those well known critiques of mass society and culture first 
and most clearly articulated in Weimar Germany by Lukacs and Heidegger in the 1920s and, a decade 
later, by Adorno and Horkheimer and Critical Theory. The liquidation of individuality by impersonal 
economic, political and cultural powers was a common theme, in the inter-war period, shared by 
intellectuals from opposite ends of the political spectrum.  In this scenario the individual is prey to dark 
social forces that threaten to overwhelm the lonely integrity of the self.  The tyranny of the-many-as-
one (Heidegger’s das Man) overwhelms the individual potential to be (to become) its own and 
authentic self. In retreat from the standardisation and uniformity of collective powers  individualism 
lapses into the solipsism—the besetting sin of all theories of  the subject from the Cartesian res 
cogitans through to Kant’s autonomous, rational subject and on into a myriad forms of  thinking in the 
last two centuries in which Thought  is locked in an endless conversation with itself. Transcendental 
loneliness  is a theme that runs through Peters’ book and echoes plaintively in its title, ‘Speaking into 
the Air’. Is there anyone out there? Or do the winds forlornly blow the words back in one’s face?  
 
The desire to communicate with others (communication as desire) is a potent theme that Peters traces 
with great ingenuity and subtlety. Dialogue— the self in communion with the Other—redeems 
subjectivity and offers the joy of inter-subjective communication. Philosophically it was, perhaps, most 
clearly expressed as an antidote to current anxieties in Martin Buber’s  I and Thou (1923). But Peters is 
not out to offer an intellectual history—the usual trajectory of histories of ideas. A great part of the 
fascination of his book lies in his uncanny ability to recognise what intellectuals think as symptomatic 
of much wider historical anxieties and concerns. Communicative loneliness takes many forms. The 
desire for perfect true communication with another, the desire of the living to communicate with the 
dead, the desire of the human species to get in touch with other species and, finally, our cosmic anxiety 
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that no life exists outside our small and lonely planet are all wondrously considered: the first in terms 
of angelic communication, the second in terms of that (to us) bizarre preoccupation with spiritualism of 
the late 19th and early 20th century, the third in terms of  thus far vain efforts to communicate with apes, 
whales and dolphins, and the fourth in terms of SETI, the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence. ET 
has not yet phoned us even though we would like to believe that they’re out there as Hollywood has 
imagined on behalf of us all. 
 
Of all these longings perhaps the most poignant is the desire for perfect union with one another, a true 
fusion of souls—angelic communication. There is a long tradition of speculation in Christian thought 
about God’s messengers who, now and then (as in the Annunciation), reveal to mortals what He has in 
mind for them. They are like us but, freed from the corruption of the body, are purely spiritual. The 
sexuality of angels has been a matter of learned dispute. Are there male and female angels and if so, 
what would their sexual union be like? Milton thought that they somehow just co-mingled and tingled 
for a bit, and Donne believed that the love of men and women had ‘just such disparity As is twixt air 
and angels purity’. Angelic communion is a perfect meeting of minds, the harmony of two hitherto 
separate souls which have now become one: ‘Our two souls, therefore, which are one, / If they be two 
endure not yet / A breach but an expansion; /  Like gold to airy thinness beat’. Something of  what 
Donne’s love poetry expressed continues to underpin much modern commonsense thinking about what 
ideally love between two people should be like; passion or perfect bodily union as the incarnate 
expression of the union of souls. Of course this is not the way we put it nowadays, but the premium we 
place on sincerity and authenticity in intimate relationships is precisely indicative of our continued 
longing for ‘true’ communication. Surveys, whether in popular magazines or sociological texts, show 
that ‘good communication’ is perhaps the most desired quality in modern relationships. There must be 
no secrets or locked doors between intimates. Each should be fully, genuinely and sincerely open to the 
other; truth as mutual self revelation.  
 
This is the first great variation on the theme of love and communication that runs through the book. 
The alternative that Peters, in many ways, prefers is non-reciprocal (or one-way) communication. 
While in some respects Peters’ historiography is fairly orthodox—he examines two historical moments 
in the last century (the 1920s and 1940s) as key moments in which ‘new’ takes on communication 
theory were worked out—in other respects it is not. There are moments in the past, he argues, that have 
an elective affinity with the present. The trick is to spot them and their expressive representatives. The 
first chapter identifies two great variations on the theme of love and communication—dialogue and 
dissemination—with which the rest of the book will be concerned. Each is a principle and a practice 
and their exponent practitioners were Socrates and Jesus. It is part of the book’s genius to treat them 
both as if they were part of our today; not ghostly voices from the dead past but present and relevant to 
our concerns. We hear them afresh because that is how Peters hears them. Neither Socrates nor Jesus 
committed themselves to writing. Our versions of them both are dependent on their followers or 
disciples: Plato on the one hand, the four gospel writers on the other. What each thought, said and did, 
and the differences between them, may serve as ‘a deep horizon’ (34) against which to view our 
contemporary dilemmas in a new light. This is the book’s radical historiography. The dead whom it 
resurrects contribute to a highly original reconfiguration of philosophy, politics and religion. The 
dialectic of the written and the spoken, the letter and the spirit, the living and the dead, logos and the 
word made flesh—these fundamental issues remain at the heart of contemporary concern with the 
problem of communication. 
 
We tend, today, to think of dialogue as genuine (real, true) communication because we think it offers, 
in principle, the possibility of coming to true and mutual understanding. Habermas’s hugely influential 
theory of communicative rationality rests firmly on normative assumptions that he shares with 
Socrates; the ideal of a co-operative, critical inquiry oriented towards coming to the best and truest 
understanding on matters of common concern through conversational question and answer. Socratic 
dialogue and the Habermasian ideal speech situation are variations on a common theme. Each is 
underpinned by a faith in relations of presence. When we meet face to face we attentively see and hear 
each other. We encounter each other in a two-way, I-Thou, inter-action. Presence is the basis and 
guarantee of witnessing. The English suffix ‘ness’ substantiates a state of being: gladness (sadness, 
madness and so on) is the essence of being glad. The ontology of witnessing is knowing-ness (OE 
witan: to know), being (in a position) to know. Presence guarantees knowledge and truth. This is what 
privileges face-to-face communication. A dominant mid-20th century definition of communication was 
in terms of ‘knowledge transfer’; getting ‘a message’ across without interference, loss or distortion. Hi-
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Fi was, for the 1950s, what DAB is for us today; the dream of perfect transmission in which the 
technology preserves the auditory quality of the original source and nothing is lost.   
 
Presence and absence; direct and indirect communication—these are central themes of  the Phaedrus in 
which Plato (who wrote it) imagines the older Socrates in conversation with the younger Phaedrus 
outside the walls of Athens. It’s a conversation about speech and writing, love, friendship and 
philosophy. It culminates in the famous critique of writing which spells out the themes of  Speaking 
into the Air.  Socrates does not like writing because you can’t ask it questions, and for Socrates asking 
questions was his discourse and his method. Moreover, once something gets written down it loses all 
sense of  propriety, ‘reaching indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no 
business with it, and it doesn’t know to whom it should speak and to whom it should not’ (quoted p 
47).  In sum: 
 
Socrates provides a checklist of enduring anxieties that arise in response to 
transformation in the means of communication. Writing parodies live presence; it is 
inhuman, lacks interiority, destroys authentic dialogue, is impersonal and cannot 
acknowledge the individuality of its interlocutors; and it is promiscuous in distribution. 
Such things have been said about printing, photography, phonography, cinema, radio, 
television and computers. The great virtue of the Phaedrus is to spell out the normative 
basis of the critique of media in remarkable clarity and, even more, to make us rethink 
what we mean by media. Communication must be soul-to-soul, among embodied live 
people, in an intimate interaction that is uniquely fit for each participant. (47) 
 
Then as now love is normatively thought as that which is between two people, alive and present to each 
other. What passes between them (love as communication: communication as love) is a joining of 
bodies and a union of souls. Conversation as the art of (mutual) seduction is the prelude to the former. 
Conversation as philosophy is a prelude to the latter—a marriage of minds. The ideal human 
relationship is the fusion of both 
 
The discourse of Jesus and his method stand in sharp contrast with Socrates. Both are exemplified in 
the parable of The Sower; a story with a message told to a large crowd on the shore of the Sea of 
Galilee. Instead of Socratic one to one, two-way communication we have one-way communication 
between a single speaker and an anonymous mass of listeners. The story of the sower makes explicit 
the significance of communication as mass dissemination or broadcasting. Before radio gave the word 
its current meaning to broadcast was an agricultural term for the scattering of seeds abroad. The sower 
in the parable scatters his seed indiscriminately. Some, as Jesus tells it, fell on stony ground and was 
pecked up by the birds of the air. Some fell among thorns and was choked as soon as it sprang up. 
Some fell on shallow soil, grew quickly but soon withered and died. And some fell on fertile ground 
and yielded a good harvest; thirty fold, sixty fold, a hundredfold. It is, of course a parable about 
parables—Jesus’s own account of his way of spreading the Word. 
 
Socrates, Peters tells us, argued for insemination as more virtuous than dissemination. Insemination is 
to implant the seed in another where it will bear fruit. Dissemination is like the sin of Onan who spilled 
his seed upon the ground. It is a wasteful scatter for there is no guarantee that the seed will, in due 
course, bear fruit. Put like this, Christ’s method of  communication is scandalously inefficient. But that, 
Peters stunningly argues, is its disinterested kindness and generosity. The parable of the sower makes 
manifest, in its form  as much as its message, that the love of God (agape) is indiscriminately available 
for all, not just  the few that are open and receptive to the Word. Broadcasting is a fundamentally 
democratic form of communication.  But more than this, and crucially, it is like the love of God in that 
it is non-reciprocal. It gives without any expectation of a return. It neither expects nor requires 
acknowledgement and thanks. The love of God is one-way and unconditional and for anyone and 
everyone anywhere anytime. It cannot be reciprocated. Something like this is the blessing of broadcast 
communication and its indiscriminate scatter. 
 
Peters, then, offers two paradigms of love and communication; one, a dialogue of intimacy and 
reciprocity, the other of indiscriminate mass dissemination. It is a contrast between personal and 
impersonal, individual and social, present and absent, embodied and disembodied relationships. 
Today we mostly, naturally, take the intimate paradigm as normative and the impersonal paradigm as 
swerving from that mark. Peters makes clear that in his view, the quest for the union of souls is the 
pursuit of a communicative Snark and much of the book is taken up with accounts of quaint human 
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attempts at making contact with the spirits, the dead, the animal kingdom and the cosmos beyond the 
world in which we dwell. Much of this is fascinating and illuminating. Occasionally it begins to feel 
like a Victorian cabinet of curiosities. Now and then it is downright odd. What is it about dolphins? Am 
I missing something? But it all goes to show and substantiate a basic premise of the book: in the age of 
communication we have all sorts of anxieties about it. Communication is, Peters frequently asserts, a 
problem, a trouble for us. Break-down seems to be the norm. 
 
What then is the obverse of this? What is good, untroubled communication? How should we recognize 
it, and how does it work?  Here Peters is less clear.  Partly he argues for bodily rather than spiritual 
union: a squeeze of the hand (the title of the concluding chapter) is a better way than words of keeping 
in touch with each other. ‘The other, not the self, should be the center of whatever “communication” 
might mean’ (264): 
 
To treat others as we would want to be treated means performing for them in such a way 
not that the self is authentically represented but that the other is caringly served. This 
kind of connection beats anything the angels might offer. Joy is found not in the 
surpassing of touch but in its fullness. (268-9) 
 
But we still seem stuck in some kind of I-Thou, self-and-other, do-as-you-would-be-done-by 
relationship. We have not escaped the self (though it has become less selfish and more saintly) and 
demands of reciprocity. To emphasise the other simply inverts but does not transcend the problem. The 
Other seems mostly to be thought as a proximal and always particular someone. Relations of presence 
or, more generally, the life-world (not a term that Peters uses) remain privileged. In the end what is not 
followed through are the issues raised by the parable of the sower.   
 
‘Speaking into the air’, the book’s title, heads the discussion of radio (206-225). It’s from a passage in 
Paul’s letter to the Christian community at Corinth in which he advises them to be cautious  in their 
practice of glossolalia (speaking with tongues):  
 
So likewise ye, except ye utter by the tongue words easy to be understood, how shall it 
be known what is spoken? for ye shall speak into the air. There are, it may be, so many 
kinds of voices in the world, and none of them is without signification (1 Cor. 14:9-10, 
King James Version) 
 
Is broadcasting a glossolalia, a confused babble of voices?  Was Christ speaking into the air when he 
addressed the crowd? Was anyone listening? Does broadcasting actually work and, if so, how? Peters’ 
discussion of radio never quite gets to grips with these questions. It is written exclusively in terms of 
American radio in its formative years and serves to remind those of us on this side of the Atlantic of the 
distance between us.  
 
In Britain the public service model of broadcasting was understood, from its beginning, in terms of 
Christ’s parable. Broadcasting House, the home of the BBC from 1932, has a famous sculpture over the 
entrance of Prospero and Ariel. Inside, in the foyer, there is another less well known carving by the 
same Catholic sculptor, Eric Gill, of The Sower. The key feature of the British model from the start, its 
core commitment, was to the universal dissemination of its radio service as an inclusive public good. 
Public service has been, and remains to this day, the dominant and still valued form whereby truly 
broadcast services are delivered in Britain and other Northern European countries. Nor does it exist in 
isolation from other public services—health and education. The continuing political will of electorates 
to support such services, in spite of the neo-Conservative challenge of the 1980s, indicates the direction 
taken by Britain and other northern European countries since the 2nd World War as one that favours 
social democracy. The USA of course has favoured a different version of democracy; one that is 
strongly libertarian, that favours individual endeavour, that rejects central government and is suspicious 
of any notion of the public good. The wholly marginal position of public service broadcasting in the 
USA (an audience share of 2% and largely dependent on voluntary donations) is indicative of this.  
 
Broadcasting, as the parable makes quite clear, is inefficient communication. It is scandalously 
wasteful and, indeed, from the start more efficient  methods of distribution have been sought, by those 
who regard radio and television as a business like any other, that target only paying ‘consumers’: pay-
per-channel, ideally pay-per-view, narrowcasting, in short. The political demand, in the UK today, to 
justify public services in economic terms is, while understandable (value for tax-payers’ money must 
 5 
be demonstrated), in the end paradoxical. The reasons and justifications for public services are, 
ultimately, ethical; they are concerned with what we think a good society should be like. They are 
underpinned by a commitment to common goods. Economic rationality is normatively thought in terms 
of individual goods—profit is private, and rational choice theory presupposes self-interest as its start 
and end point. It may help to rationalise the delivery of common goods, preventing waste and 
corruption, but it can never justify them. Americans are cynical about their radio and television services 
because they see them simply as businesses and, therefore exploitative. They’re in it for the money. 
Their job is selling audiences to advertisers. They are intrinsically manipulative. From such a 
perspective it’s hard to take seriously the actual services provided. You’d better not believe what you 
see and hear from ‘the media industries, whose economic well-being depends on convincing audiences 
to trust the sincerity of distant testimonials’ (224).  
 
Americans, to paraphrase de Tocqueville, treat their media as kings do their courtiers—they enrich and 
despise them. For Peters the question is, ‘Can you take part without being there in the flesh? Can an 
audience be said to participate in a remote event?’—obviously not, if you don’t trust the media who 
provide access to such occasions. Maybe this is why Peters insists on ‘the bodily context of all 
communication’, but this is an argument that deserves to be challenged. What warrants the privileging 
of the body and haptic communication? Touch is as potentially fraught as everything else. ‘To be in 
touch’ may be desirable, but ‘touchy’ folk are hard to live with. Every family should have a good 
hugger according to the late Princess of Wales, but I would be worried if I was embraced by, say, that 
well-known family hugger, Tony Soprano. Judas betrayed Jesus with a kiss.  The emphasis throughout 
the book on the erotics of communication confirms its normative preference for touchy twosomes. Sex 
between two is a good thing, but mass sex is nowhere advocated: those anonymous, impersonal, 
multiple and public couplings that take place in orgies or love-ins as they were quaintly called in those 
far-off hippy times of Hair and the dawning of the Age of Aquarius. Peters is of course right to insist 
on the holiness of the body and incarnate human love between two people. He does not offer us though 
a thought out vision of the love of God which, in the parable, is transcendent, impersonal, non-
reciprocal and universal. And yet, I think, in strictly non-theological terms one has to argue for this as 
the transcendent character of the ordinary, everyday human world in which we live today and, indeed, 
of humanity itself. 
 
An alternative starting point for thinking about communication, then, which I prefer, is not the 
individual, nor ‘language’, nor self and other, but the world. I have always been struck, ever since I 
started work on it, by the essential worldliness of broadcasting. That is why I was so bowled over by 
Heidegger’s stunning analysis of the umwelt, the round-about-me everyday world in which ‘I’, in each 
case, dwell.  We encounter the world and all its everyday things as zuhanden, as ‘ready-to-hand’ or, 
simply, handy—a pragmatics, not an erotics, of touch. From reading Being and Time I at last came to 
understand the world as interactively communicative in all its parts and as a whole; the world ‘as a 
relational totality of involvements’. Everyday things are indeed pragmata but we should pause to 
consider exactly how it is that they are so and not otherwise, and it is part of Heidegger’s extraordinary 
genius to remind us of this.  The world and everything in it are not for the few, the initiates, the clever 
ones, but anyone and everyone. Grice thought that the logic which, he argued, underpins the 
communicative structure of talk also underpins all kinds of non-linguistic human actions and 
interactions. He did not develop this claim, but I want to suggest that his analysis of ordinary language 
points in the same direction as Heidegger’s analysis of the ordinary world; namely that in its parts and 
as a whole they both (the world and language) have as the necessary precondition of their availability 
(their intelligibility and usability to all practical intents and purposes) an immanent communicative 
logic that anyone can understand and accordingly interact with and put to good use.  It is our task, as I 
see it, to explicate this communicative logic; to show in detail how it is so, how it (the world and 
language) works in this way. Reading Peters makes me want to add one more thing.  I now see the 
communicative infrastructure of the world has having the same characteristics that are indicated by the 
parable of the sower. It is impersonal. It is available to anyone. It demands no return. And this is  as 
indicative of worldly as of divine love—what Hannah Arendt thought of as amor mundi, the world’s 
care-for-itself—and our transcendent human, historical essence.  
 
When I was child I was taught that the three great virtues are faith, hope and charity. I was touched, 
this summer, to see them represented as angels hovering above the good and wise ruler in the 
marvellous allegorical fresco of Good and Bad Government by Ambrogio Lorenzetti in one of the great 
rooms of the Palazzo Publico that towers over the beautiful shell-shaped campo at the heart of the 
Tuscan city of Siena. I found myself reflecting how well they understood, in 13th and 14th century Italy, 
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the relationship between religion and politics expressed, in so many ways, in the art and architecture of 
the place. The town’s great religious building, its Duomo, is in its own and separate space from the 
campo and palazzo. It is said that the towers of the cathedral and the palace were built to exactly the 
same height so that neither should be seen to dominate the other.  We have long since lost that 
equitable poise between secular and sacred existence which the Commune of Siena and many other 
Italian towns and cities achieved centuries ago, and we are the poorer for it.  
 
The thinking of John Durham Peters has a rare quality today: it is naturally and essentially religious. It 
informs the ways in which he thinks about society, politics and communication. It is redemptive 
thinking that gives us back the possibility of recognising something we no longer understand about 
ourselves. How can we speak today, for instance, of love and communication in any public, political, 
worldly sense?  But Peters does and I am thereby encouraged to think that faith, hope and charity 
continue to underpin the communicative structures of today’s world and our everyday existence in it. 
Public service broadcasting, for instance, is an ethical communicative practice that is underpinned by 
what were once thought of as the three great theological virtues. Faith, hope and charity all presuppose 
each other. To act in good faith presupposes hope in a good outcome. The former underpins our present 
actions while the latter expresses what we wish for as their future prospects. Charity, or love, is the 
mediating agency, the grace (the holy spirit) that is between faith and hope. It is their condition and 
guarantee, the unity of their practice and desire. That love, like the love of God, is immanent in all 
those anonymous worldly institutions, artefacts and practices that give without any expectation or 
demand of a return. Much of the everyday world is like this, although we seldom see it as such.  Mass 
mediated distant communication is greater than immediate communication between present twosomes. 
Non-reciprocal love surpasses reciprocal love. It is more blessed to give than to receive.  I have thought 
about these things since reading Speaking into the Air and have more to say on them; but that would 
take me beyond the scope of these reflections on the wonderful book that John Durham Peters has 
given us. 
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